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a b s t r a c t
Desert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS) is a multi-year series of
hardware and operations tests carried out annually in the high desert of Arizona on
the San Francisco Volcanic Field. These activities are designed to exercise planetary
surface hardware and operations in conditions where long-distance, multi-day roving is
achievable, and they allow NASA to evaluate different mission concepts and approaches
in an environment less costly and more forgiving than space. The results from the RATS
tests allow selection of potential operational approaches to planetary surface explora-
tion prior to making commitments to specific flight and mission hardware develop-
ment. In previous RATS operations, the Science Support Room has operated largely in an
advisory role, an approach that was driven by the need to provide a loose science
mission framework that would underpin the engineering tests. However, the extensive
nature of the traverse operations for 2010 expanded the role of the science operations
and tested specific operational approaches. Science mission operations approaches from
the Apollo and Mars-Phoenix missions were merged to become the baseline for this
test. Six days of traverse operations were conducted during each week of the 2-week
test, with three traverse days each week conducted with voice and data communica-
tions continuously available, and three traverse days conducted with only two 1-hour
communications periods per day. Within this framework, the team evaluated integrated
science operations management using real-time, tactical science operations to oversee
daily crew activities, and strategic level evaluations of science data and daily traverse
results during a post-traverse planning shift. During continuous communications, both
tactical and strategic teams were employed. On days when communications were
reduced to only two communications periods per day, only a strategic team was
employed. The Science Operations Team found that, if communications are good and
down-linking of science data is ensured, high quality science returns is possible
regardless of communications. What is absent from reduced communications is the
scientific interaction between the crew on the planet and the scientists on the ground.
These scientific interactions were a critical part of the science process and significantly
improved mission science return over reduced communications conditions. The test also
showed that the quality of science return is not measurable by simple numerical quantities
but is, in fact, based on strongly non-quantifiable factors, such as the interactions between
the crew and the Science Operations Teams. Although the metric evaluation data suggested
some trends, there was not sufficient granularity in the data or specificity in the metrics to
allow those trends to be understood on numerical data alone.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of IAA.
1. Introduction—overview of the Desert RATS 2010
operation
The 2010 Desert RATS test was a 14-day operation
conducted at Black Point in the San Francisco Volcanic
Field near Flagstaff, AZ, with 2 small-pressurized rover
prototypes. Each rover was operated with a 2-person crew
consisting of an engineer/commander and a scientist,
testing a variety of operations approaches within a
scenario of human exploration of the lunar surface (see
[1] for a complete description of 2010 and preceding
years’ RATS missions). Each rover crew conducted a
7-day mission with a mid-mission crew change at the
end of Day 7. Mission operations oversight was provided
by a Mission Operations Team from the Mission Opera-
tions Directorate at Johnson Space Center, which operated
out of a remote Mission Control Center (rMCC) located at
Black Point Base Camp, and a variety of science operations
teams also operating at Black Point and in Flagstaff.
The overarching goal of the test was to operate the
rovers under contrasting communications states and modes
of rover operations (see Table 1). In order to understand the
effects of different communications conditions on science
operations, three traverse days each week were conducted
with complete voice and data communications available
throughout each 24-h day with no delay between transmis-
sion and reception (called ‘‘Continuous Comm’’, or CC). The
remaining three traverse days simulated operations with
two E1-h orbital communications satellite passes per day,
a condition referred to as twice-a-day comms, or 2/day, that
might be in extant during exploration on the lunar far side.
In this test case, the assumption was that communications
took place every 12 h. In addition to varying communica-
tions conditions, rovers were operated either as a mutually
supporting team (called ‘‘Lead and Follow’’), with each rover
simultaneously exploring the same terrain, or with each
rover in communications contact, but working in different
portions of the field area (called ‘‘Divide and Conquer’’). The
testing and communication schedule is delineated in
Table 1. In addition to the 12 days of active exploration, 2
days were devoted to operations in a Habitat Demonstration
Unit (HDU) Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) (see [2]).
The Desert RATS 2010 test employed a variety of
science operations teams whose task was to manage
science operations from support rooms either at the Black
Point Base Camp or in Flagstaff, AZ. Selection of the team
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members who would man the Science Support Rooms
was a critical decision in that the quality of team would
relate directly to the quality of the results. Each team
selected was composed of scientists with a background in
planetary sciences, and who were at a mix of career levels
ranging from graduate students to senior scientists. This
selection ensured that each team member would have a
background in the science operations conducted by the
rover crews and would be better prepared to evaluate the
mission. The Science Operations Team consisted of 38
members drawn from 5 NASA Centers, 2 International
Partner organizations, 8 universities, and 3 government
agencies, and had over 400 years of accumulated experience
as scientists working all over the world, including over 37
years of combined geologic fieldwork experience. In addi-
tion, professional diversity was equally critical, given the
variety of scientific and operational problems encountered.
Members of the RATS Science Operations Team had technical
backgrounds in geology, planetary science, astronomy,
mining engineering, spaceflight operations, mechanical engi-
neering, and experience in such diverse areas as field
geology, oil and gas exploration, geophysics, information
technology, mining engineering, mine automation and
robotics, mineral economics, oceanography, Space Shuttle
image analysis, International Space Station research facility
development, aerospace engineering, planetary science mis-
sion operations, geochemistry, volcanology, impact cratering,
igneous petrology, tectonics, and lunar sample analysis.
Lastly, experience on space missions was also extensive,
with team members having participated in 5 Apollo mis-
sions, 2 Mars Exploration Rover missions, 27 Space Shuttle
Missions, 6 International Space Station expeditions, NASA-
Mir, Stardust, Long-Duration Exposure Facility, Mars Recon-
naissance Orbiter, Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing
Satellite, Mars-Phoenix, MAVEN, Fermi Gamma Ray Tele-
scope and the BioSAR mission.
Each Science Operations Team was responsible for
testing science operations management concepts in con-
cert with the larger mission control team, conducting
either real-time, tactical science operations during the
day or strategic planning operations conducted at night.
Each scientist rotated through several assignments as part
of the test. The purpose of this rotation was: (1) to provide
exposure to different ground support functions within
each team, thus developing a cadre of experienced science
support personnel for future NASA missions; and (2) to
evaluate the quality of the science operations throughout
the test. In particular, exposure to multiple aspects of the
operation by each individual was expected to provide a
more statistically balanced evaluation of the quality of the
operation, and helped eliminate single-point biases that
might be introduced with a more limited exposure by
each team member.
The purpose of this paper is to document the lessons
learned by the Science Operations Team during the course of
Desert RATS 2010, in order to apply those lessons to future
Desert RATS tests. In addition to the experience of the Science
Operations Team, a critical task of the overall RATS 2010 test
was to also document the lessons learned from of the rover
crews during the conduct of the test. Several papers in this
volume, including Love and Bleacher [3]; Bleacher et al. [4];
and, Hurtado et al. [5], summarize the crew experience and
the lessons learned by the geologists and astronauts who
were serving in the rovers on Desert RATS 2010. Lastly, Bell
et al. [6], summarize the lessons learned by the Mission
Operations Directorate crew in the rMCC.
2. Science operations management—historical
perspectives from crewed and robotic science missions,
with applications to the 2010 RATS test
Management of science activities during real-time
mission operations has been critical to improving the
science return of NASA missions. The Apollo human lunar
expeditions and the Mars-Phoenix mission provided con-
trasting approaches to the science operations manage-
ment during planetary surface exploration.
2.1. Apollo lunar missions
Although the early Apollo missions were pursued as
largely engineering exercises, later Apollo missions
Table 1
Desert RATS testing schedule.
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concentrated on extensive scientific exploration of the
lunar surface. Understanding the nature of surface mis-
sion operations during the Apollo missions requires
assessment of both the nature of the individual parts
and how they were successfully woven together to
produce the very synergistic scientific legacy of Apollo
Lunar Exploration Program. Years prior to the Apollo 11
landing, it was fully appreciated by science leaders and
NASA management that President Kennedy’s challenge to
the Nation represented an unprecedented opportunity for
global scientific leadership and establishing a scientific
legacy that would forever change the way in which we
understand the origin and evolution of the Earth and
planets. This overarching understanding led to the devel-
opment of significant scientific input to all aspects of the
missions, ranging from landing site selection; planning of
lunar surface operations and traverses; selection and
funding of a wide array of scientific instrumentation to
be utilized and deployed both in orbit and on the surface;
astronaut selection and training, including astronaut geo-
logic field and classroom training (e.g., [7]); development
of new hardware to assist and extend scientific operations
(e.g., the Lunar Roving Vehicle); development of new
operations techniques to optimize and extend exploration
(e.g., Standup EVAs from the LM cabin); field operations
training that included astronauts, scientists, mission
operations staff and NASA managers working as a team
during joint integrated mission simulations in the field;
and extensive post-mission debriefings and lessons-
learned discussions (see, e.g., Compton [8] or Baldwin
[9] for a comprehensive discussion of science planning
and execution during Apollo). All of these background
activities contributed significantly to successful surface
operations on the Moon, but perhaps the most fundamental
lesson from the Apollo experience is that optimal planetary
surface operations in the future must be based on broad,
synergistic foundation of science, astronauts and operations.
The actual landing on the Moon and onset of surface
operations was preceded a wide range of activities that
developed the partnerships that worked so well during
mission operations. Starting soon after their selection,
astronauts received geological training in the classroom
and on field trips (see, e.g., [7]). When an astronaut was
chosen for a particular mission, they participated in the
discussions concerning the selection of the landings sites
and worked with scientists to familiarize themselves with
the choices involved, the scientific goals and objectives
and the potential operational challenges (H. Schmitt and
J. Head, personal communication, 2009 and 2012). Once
sites were selected, astronauts, operations personnel and
scientists worked closely together to develop lunar sur-
face exploration traverse plans which were then simu-
lated and tested in field training trips with the prime and
backup astronaut crews, the astronauts who would talk
with the flight crew on the lunar surface (CAPCOMs),
scientists, operations personnel, and mission controllers.
These types of close coordination activities developed
partnerships, respect, mutual insights and understanding.
Scientists understood the complexity of operations and
the time constraints of being on the lunar surface, astro-
nauts understood the scientific objectives and how they
could accomplish and exceed them, mission operations
personnel understood the importance of the scientific
objectives and developed insights and new techniques
into how they could assist in their accomplishment, and
flight control personnel learned how to organize and
implement the surface operations in order to optimize
the ability to accomplish and exceed the scientific objec-
tives for the mission. Many of these types of simulations,
both in the field and in Mission Control in Houston took
place before launch. In addition, astronauts, CAPCOMs,
traverse planners and scientists had many briefings in the
months prior to launch in Houston and at the Kennedy
Space Center on details of the specific mission traverses
and mission operations. At these meetings, the specific
geology of the landing sites, the scientific objectives of the
mission, and the implementation of these objectives
through a set of pre-planned traverses and sampling
operations were reviewed and discussed (J. Head, F. Ho¨rz,
personal communication, 2012), and inputs from the
astronauts were sought and implemented.
In the conduct of each mission, the purpose of the flight
control team that operated out of the Mission Operations
Control Room (MOCR) at Johnson Space Center was to
manage the time of the crewmembers on the lunar surface
in order to meet mission timelines, and evaluate the
health and status of the crew and spacecraft in real time,
in order to be able to respond to emergencies as soon
as possible [13]. During lunar surface operations, the
CAPCOMs were scientist-astronauts who had worked
extensively with the crew during training and were highly
versed in the mission science objectives (W. Phinney,
F. Ho¨rz and G. Lofgren, personal communication, 2009
and 2010). Hierarchically below the MOCR positions were
a wide variety of back room positions that directly
supported the primary flight controllers in the MOCR,
including a Field Geology Experiment Support Room. In
the case of science support on Apollos 15–17, this Support
Roomwas in turn assisted by an informal group of scientists
in a different room who could follow the operations in real
time, but who had limited capability to influence operations
taking place in the chain of support rooms above them. The
most important purpose of these science support teams was
to provide the front room controllers with science expertise
that, in conjunction with the expertise in science operations
developed by the scientist/astronaut/flight control com-
bined team, would make real-time decisions on science
operations questions raised on the lunar surface (J. Head,
personal communication, 2012).
Each mission developed, prior to launch, a detailed
science support plan in order to ensure that mission
science objectives were met (e.g., [10–12]). The purpose
of these plans were to, ‘‘ydescribe the manner in which
the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) plans to execute
the mission control functions for the experiments an
integrally related operational objectives assignedyin
the Mission Requirements Document [13].’’ In addition,
a stated objective of these plans was to, ‘‘attempt to
nullify the effects of events perturbing the mission plan
and recover nominal mission plan execution conditions
[13],’’ and, ‘‘y[to] maximize the capability to move into
alternate modes of operation when quick-look data
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review indicates unusual opportunities exist to maximize
science objectives [13].’’ The pre-planned traverses and
individual activities at the stations were designed as a
‘‘nominal plan’’, but were in no way thought of as a ‘‘pre-
determined script’’. The broad scientific objectives were
always kept in mind by the astronauts and the scientists,
and it was understood that if new developments occurred
during surface operations that could accomplish the
objective better than the preplanned activities, than these
new objectives clearly had priority and that it was the call
of astronaut on the surface as to what to do. For example,
the discovery by Dave Scott and Jim Irwin of the ‘‘Genesis
Rock’’ (Apollo sample number 15415), the ‘‘green glass
beads’’, and the ‘‘Seat Belt basalt’’ on Apollo 15 clearly called
deviation from the nominal plan. Due to the extensive and
close pre-mission training and coordination, scientists on
the ground had great confidence in the astronauts on the
surface to recognize the critical new discoveries and to act
accordingly (J. Head, personal communication, 2012). In a
similar manner, when operations on the surface deviated
from the nominal plan (e.g., time expended extracting the
drill on Apollo 15), scientists, engineers and operations
personnel on the surface revised the nominal plan while
the astronauts on the surface continued their focused
operations.
By the time a given Apollo mission was executed, a
well-integrated team had developed. Astronauts on the
surface conducted scientific analysis and exploration.
Mission operations staff and mission controllers main-
tained seamless operations and monitored hardware
behavior in order to optimize the time that the astronauts
on the surface had for science and exploration. Scientists
monitored the progress of the astronauts on the surface
and assessed their scientific descriptions and sample
acquisition progress and if necessary, the Science Back
Room in the Mission Control Center could provide broad
input to the crew through the CAPCOM. However, the
scientists were confident in the ability of the crew to
identify and respond correctly to new discoveries. The
general attitude was, ‘‘Let the astronauts do the job they
are trained to do and be ready to help when necessary.’’
Post-EVA debriefs provided the opportunity to give
updates and revised traverses, but the exploration of the
surface was undertaken by the astronauts, representing
the combined Science/Mission Operations Team.
This team effort was the key to mission success in the
Apollo Lunar Exploration Program and resulted in its
enduring scientific legacy. The lessons learned from this
endeavor are: (1) involve all teammembers together early
in the process and build synergism, (2) work together in
the scientific training of the astronaut partners so that
they can operate on the surface as explorers, not puppets,
and (3) stand ready to help at any time during their
independent surface operations and exploration, and
expect to exchange input between periods of surface
activity. Clearly, during longer periods of surface opera-
tions on future planetary expeditions, the long time scale
of communication will necessitate a significant degree of
astronaut independence and autonomy [14]. Thus the
Apollo experience may serve as an essential and helpful
guide for developing and optimizing this synergism.
2.1.1. Mars-Phoenix mission
The Mars-Phoenix Mission was a robotic lander mis-
sion that operated on the Martian surface between May
and November 2008 [15]. Although not a rover mission,
the Mars-Phoenix Mission Team built its operations
approach on lessons learned in the Mars Exploration
Rover mission [16]. A critical factor in Mars-Phoenix
mission operations was managing data return from the
surface within a limited return data budget, which drove
the Mars-Phoenix team to operate essentially two plan-
ning processes: (1) a tactical process that dealt exclu-
sively with those science activities whose commands
were up-linked to the spacecraft each Martian day, and
(2) a strategic process that considered those science
activities that would be executed over the longer planning
horizon of the total mission duration [16]. The require-
ment for teams to operate under different planning
horizons was a function of mission duration. In particular,
both the MER and Mars-Phoenix missions operated for
much longer periods of time than the Apollo missions,
and consequently had a much longer time to accomplish
mission science operations.
The tactical science operations planning process on
Mars-Phoenix determined the specific science data that
could be collected within a single Martian day, which was
balanced against the spacecraft capabilities, engineering
constraints and the daily data up- and down-link limita-
tions of the spacecraft and the Deep Space Network. To
that end, a given tactical planning process involved active
interplay between engineering constraints and science
objectives. Using these constraints and objectives, the
tactical planning process generated a series of commands
that could be uploaded to the Mars-Phoenix lander in
time for execution in the upcoming day (see [16], Table 2,
for an excellent graphic on the Mars-Phoenix tactical
process).
Bass and Talley [16] defined strategic processes as
including, ‘‘ythe generation of midterm and also long-
term ‘strategic’ science plan that describes the possible
lander actions from 4 to 11 sols in the future.’’ Conse-
quently, the strategic science operations process for Mars-
Phoenix involved an analysis of high-level science objec-
tives that would be decomposed into more detailed
activities. These detailed activities would, in turn, feed
the tactical planning process for each day. It is expected
that the 2-way communications travel times between
targets outside of cis-Lunar space will, in the future,
necessitate conducting a strategic science process with
human landed missions in a manner similar to Mars-
Phoenix, and the 2010 RATS Science Operations Test
was designed, in part, to test that process with human
exploration crews.
2.1.2. Application of the Apollo and Mars-Phoenix science
Operations processes to the desert RATS 2010 science
Operations test
During pre-mission planning, it became clear that the
communications design planned for the mission would
allow conversations between Mission Operations Teams
at Black Point Base Camp and the crew in the field to
occur without any communications delay. This operation
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was largely identical to kind of operations carried out on
Apollo, which were characterized as ‘‘tactical’’ in nature.
Given the length of the planned 2010 mission, it was also
clear that assimilating and analyzing the data produced
during each day’s operations would be an important
process for influencing plans on subsequent traverse days.
Consequently, the science team decided that in addition
to tactical science operations on RATS 2010, the Science
Operations Team would conduct a strategic science
operation in order to test the efficacy of strategic planning
on the conduct of future human planetary surface opera-
tions. This test would integrate operations approaches
proven to be successful on both human and robotic
planetary exploration programs.
3. RATS 2010 science Operations test overview
The objectives for science operations at Desert RATS
2010 were to (1) evaluate operations with two Tactical
Science Operations Teams (TSOT), and a Strategic Science
Operations Team (SSOT); and (2) evaluate a methodology
for measuring science productivity as a function of varying
communications conditions. The TSOTs were responsible
for managing real-time operations of the crewmembers at
each station and assumed operational control of the
crewmembers from the Test Director and the Mission
Operations Test Team whenever they were off the rovers
and conducting exploratory science. During the traverses
between stations, the Test Director and the Mission
Operations Directorate control team managed the rovers,
although all visible images and verbal communications
with the crew were available to each TSOT in real time.
The SSOT was responsible for evaluating the scientific
output of each day’s activities and conducting, as neces-
sary, replanning efforts after each day’s traverse opera-
tions had been completed. Traverses would be replanned
based on either science objectives missed or serendipitous
science discoveries that potentially would alter mission
Table 2
Science Data Collection Metric. The individual scores from each sub-area were summed to give the total score. Data
collected on Desert RATS 2010 are shown graphically in Figs. 4 through 6.
Rating Definition Description
Regional context
0 None No geologic context described
1 Limited Sketchy geologic context described
2 Sufficient Geologic context described and understood in Science Support Room;
in particular, how do the units at this site relate to the units in previous sites
Stratigraphy
0 None No stratigraphic relations described
1 Limited Relationship of stratigraphic units not described
2 Sufficient Stratigraphic relationships between units described and information
understood in the Science Support Room
Stratigraphic sampling
0 None No stratigraphic units sampled
1 Limited Not all stratigraphic units sampled
2 Sufficient All stratigraphic units sampled
Sample description
0 None No sample descriptions
1 Limited Not all samples were adequately described
2 Sufficient Samples were sufficiently described and understood
in the Science Support Room
Sample collection
0 None No Sample numbers and collection boxes described
1 Limited Not all sample numbers and collection boxes described
2 Sufficient Samples numbers and collection box designation were sufficiently
described and understood by the Science Support Room
Summary
0–10 Combined score A maximum score of 10 would mean that all science available science data
from a given station had been acquired during the activities at that station
Fig. 1. Science team relationships on Desert RATS 2010. The job of the
Field Science Operations Team (FSOT) was to operate as a loss-of-
communications backup, and under nominal operations would not have
an input into the information flow depicted in this chart. In the event of
a loss of communications, the FSOT would assume the responsibilities of
the Tactical Science Operations Teams.
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science objectives. In addition to the Strategic and Tactical
Science Operations Teams, a Field Science Operations
Team (FSOT) operated during each traverse day. The
FSOT’s job was to evaluate crew performance without
the filter of the communications net that existed for the
other teams. In particular, the FSOT members looked at
crew performance on the various geologic tasks as a way
of understanding, where necessary, how communications
affected the remote Science Operations Team s’ perception
of science effectiveness. In addition, it was planned that
the FSOT would take operational control of the science
mission in the field if a major breakdown in communica-
tions took place. However, no serious communications
failures occurred during the 2010 RATS mission and this
function was not tested.
As part of the overall science mission management
activity, a designated Mission Lead Scientist participated
daily in Mission Management Team (MMT) meetings (see
Fig. 1 below), where science results and their potential
impact on the overall operation were discussed with the
Mission Manager and other team leads, including the
Rover Team, the Mission Operations Team and the Astro-
naut Office representative. The Science Team participated
as a full member of the Mission Management Team, and
science objectives, as much as engineering objectives,
drove decision making throughout the test. In addition
to MMT participation, the Mission Lead Scientist
debriefed the rover crews at the end of the day, gave a
‘‘hand-off’’ briefing to the SSOT each evening at the start
of their shift, and conducted the morning science briefing
to the rover crews.
3.1. Science operations team schedules
The TSOT operated from 7:00 AM to 5:30 PM each day of
continuous communications and PEM operations (see
Fig. 2). Each rover had a dedicated TSOT. During 2/Day
communications test, the TSOTs stood down from opera-
tions. Each member of the team was responsible for a
particular segment of the operation, including overall man-
agement of daily science objectives, interfacing with the
Mission Operations Team, management of sample docu-
mentation, collecting data on geologic context, and evaluat-
ing data from a variety of cameras and science instruments
on the Rovers. The two TSOTs operated out of dedicated
Science Support Rooms at Black Point Base Camp.
The SSOT shift began at roughly 8:00 PM, ending when
a data analysis and replanning effort was complete. A
typical SSOT shift ended at E4:00 AM. Each individual on
the SSOT was responsible for analyzing a particular
science data set and developing an understanding of what
was accomplished during the previous day, recommend-
ing on the basis of that analysis if any changes needed to
be made to the following day’s activities.
4. Detailed overview of RATS science team operation
4.1. Tactical Science Operations Team (TSOT)
The TSOT had three objectives: (1) evaluate the effec-
tiveness of science data collection during each shift; (2)
provide technical assistance to the rover crews during
geologic operations; and, (3) evaluate the effectiveness of
the science operations setup as implemented for Desert
RATS 2010. Each tactical team worked with an assigned
rover crew, coordinating with the Test Director to accom-
plish the daily science plan. In addition, the Science Leads
for each TSOT conducted face-to-face tag-ups while rovers
were traversing between stations to resolve any issues that
arose at a given station.
4.1.1. TSOT membership
Each TSOT was staffed with the following team mem-
bers, who operated console positions in each TSOT:
 Team Lead (SCIENCE)—Responsible for all science
operations decisions for a given rover.
 Science Communicator (SCICOM)—Direct voice link
with the rover crew; patterned after the CAPCOM
position in the higher level test control room, SCICOM
was the only Science Support Room person to interact
directly with the crew during EVA operations.
 Documentarian—Responsible for maintaining a diary
of all science operations, including problems that arose
and notable science accomplishments.
 Operations Team Liaison (OPSLINK) (co-located with
Test Director)—Responsible for communication ‘‘hand-
offs’’ between the Test Director (TD) and the Science
Team Lead as well as acting as liaison between teams
on any operational issues.
 EV1 Science Lead (EV1) and EV2 Science Lead (EV2)—Re-
sponsible for overseeing the science operations of the
Fig. 2. Daily operations schedule for RATS 2010.
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EV1 crewmember, including data captures from EVA
system cameras (see Hurtado et al. [5] and Bleacher et
al. [4], for specific descriptions of camera assets available
to the crew), as well as keeping track of science descrip-
tions while on EVA and assisting the Science Team Lead
with science questions arose during EVAs.
 GigaPan Operator (GIGAPAN)—Responsible for initiat-
ing data acquisition, download and initial evaluation of
image quality from the GigaPan camera system on
each rover, and providing an evaluation of the geology
of the local rover area to assist the Science Team Lead
with real-time science questions during EVA.
 MastCam Operator (MASTCAM)—Responsible for initi-
ating data acquisition, download and initial assessment
of image quality from the MastCam camera system on
each rover, and providing an evaluation of the geology
of the local rover area to assist the Science Team Lead
with real-time science questions during EVA.
When a rover crew was working GeoLab operations
during PEM operations days, the appropriate TSOT room
was used to manage these operations (see Evans et al. [2],
for a detailed description of GeoLab design and opera-
tions). Data acquisition activities were conducted from
the TSOT room using the GEOIMAGE and GEODATA
system (see Evans et al. [2]) using available consoles that
would otherwise be used for rover operations.
4.1.2. TSOT evaluation of science operations
The TSOTs maintained track of the daily timeline as the
mission proceeded, ensuring that the following activities
occurred:
 science objectives were met for each mission phase;
 sample documentation data was collected in real time;
 geologic context information was provided by the
crewmembers;
 timelines for each station were executed as planned.
Each TSOT member was responsible for evaluating the
effectiveness of science activities on RATS 2010 using a
daily science score sheet (see Tables 2–5). These forms
were designed to evaluate whether the activities per-
formed at a given location were effective at determining
geologic context and geologic sample character, evaluat-
ing sample documentation procedure, and to help deter-
mine the causes of errors when science data collection
was less than optimal.
4.2. Strategic Science Operations Team (SSOT)
4.2.1. Team objectives
The Strategic Science Operations Team (SSOT) objec-
tives were to (1) assimilate and synthesize the data
collected in the day’s activities to determine if planned
objectives had been met, or if there were any discoveries
in the previous day’s traverses that would necessitate
replanning efforts for the following day’s traverses;
(2) conduct traverse replanning; (3) set priorities for
downlinked data products for the upcoming tactical
process; (4) identify and prioritize samples for further
analysis on GeoLab operations days; and, (5) evaluate the
quality of science data derived in the field by the rover
crews and filtered by the Tactical Science Operations Team.
4.2.2. Team methodology
The SSOT operated in a phased approach: the imaging
teams and the individual Rover Science Data Teams
reviewed their data sets and prepared recommendations
for SSOT Lead and the rest of the team. If replanning of the
Table 3
Science Operations Metric. As with the Science Data Collection Metric, the individual scores from each sub-area were summed to give the total score.
Area rated Rating Descriptor Definition
Operations process 0 Unacceptable Process does not allow science team to address the posed science questions
1 Borderline Process is working but improvements are warranted
2 Acceptable Process allows science team to address the posed science questions
Operational roles 0 Unacceptable Role not required for successful operations, i.e., duplication of efforts among roles.
1 Borderline Role required, but improvements are warranted
2 Acceptable Role required and no improvements necessary (i.e., work load adequate, etc.)
Science data/
hypotheses tracking
0 Unacceptable Process does not make sufficient data available to evaluate a given hypothesis
1 Borderline Process makes available some data, but many questions remain after a given operation
2 Acceptable Process allows sufficient data to clearly evaluate hypotheses
Operational
leadership
0 Unacceptable Leadership inadequate to allow operations team to complete the science mission
1 Borderline Leadership provides some assistance to the operations team in completion of the science mission, but
team is often unable to complete science mission due to lack of direction
2 Acceptable Leadership provides assistance and direction during science operations process; makes it easy for the
team to complete the science mission
Operations facilities 0 Unacceptable Operations team is unable to acquire and process data, and manage the science mission
1 Borderline Operations team is able to acquire and process data, and manage the science mission, but with
significant difficulty




Science operations worked flawlessly and no improvements necessary
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following day’s activities was called for, the rest of the
SSOT participated in this effort in order to be completed
by the following morning’s uplink briefing. See Fig. 3 for a
typical strategic planning process.
4.2.3. SSOT membership
The SSOT was staffed by 10 geoscientists who per-
formed the following functions. Some teams were staffed
with multiple individuals, who shifted job assignments as
the strategic evaluation and planning process proceeded
through a given shift.
 Team Lead—Responsible for management and comple-
tion of all activities of the SSOT, including replanning of
traverses for the following day’s science operations and
development of the daily science plan.
 Documentarian—Responsible for keeping a real-time
log of all activities that occurred within a given shift.
 Strategic Operations Lead—Responsible for managing
long-term operational constraints that affected the
daily replanning process, including communications
constraints, long-term mission objectives, and con-
sumables constraints.
 Activity Planners—Responsible for preparing the
revised daily plan for each rover crew based on the
recommendations of the SSOT Lead.
 Long-Term Planning Lead—Responsible for (1) coordi-
nating science team groups working on datasets that
were critical to planning the next day’s tactical activ-
ities; (2) determining whether there were any critical
discoveries that warranted further study; (3) deter-
mining whether there were any issues that would pose
a continuing threat to achievement of mission science
objectives; (4) revising the traverse plans; and, (5)
leading the end-of-day science discussion.
 Geology Team—Responsible for analyzing the data set
produced by the Rover imaging and science teams, and
making specific recommendations to the Strategic
Operations Lead on revising the following day’s geo-
logic traverses.
 Mineralogy/Petrology Team—Responsible for analyzing
the data set produced by the Rover imaging and science
teams, making specific recommendations to the Strategic
Operations Lead on revising the following day’s geologic
traverses, maintaining sample prioritization, and identify-
ing key samples for further analysis on PEM days.
 Rover Imagery Data Team—Responsible for assimilat-
ing the data sets from each rover team from a given
day and preparing a summary of results, including
(1) key results; and, (2) specific key images that illu-
strated operations during the day’s traverse activities.
 GigaPan Data Team—Responsible for reviewing the pre-
vious days GigaPan imagery data and preparing a sum-
mary for the SSOT of (1) the images from each traverse
station; and, (2) specific key images that illustrated the
accomplishments at a given traverse station.
 Rover Science Data Team—Responsible for assimilating
specific geologic data to prepare a summary for the SSOT
of that day’s science accomplishments, including (1)
selecting key images and science results for presentation
to the traverse planners; (2) assessing completion or
non-completion of day’s plan; (3) identifying ‘‘broke
points’’ or areas of unusual accomplishments that might
affect the following day’s plan; and, (4) keeping a log of
all samples collected, including sample description, cri-
tical curation data, and an assessment of what samples




1 Limited Data does not allow understanding of the scientific context of the field area
2 Adequate Data reaffirms existing hypotheses and facts
3 Sufficient Data reaffirms existing hypotheses and facts in new areas or levels of detail
4 Significant Data potentially elucidates or modifies existing hypotheses in new areas or level of detail
5 Exceptional Data potentially resolves a major scientific question or highly significant hypothesis
6 Discovery Data potentially introduces a novel idea or hypothesis
Table 5
Technology/Operations Implementation Metric.
0 Poor Complete failure of instrumentation or total operator error led to missing or largely incomplete geologic data and/or sample
documentation information.
1 Limited Instrumentation failure or major operator error led to minimal geologic context and sample data available, but not sufficient to
establish a large scale understanding of the geologic terrane or sample character.
2 Good Hardware functioned well and operator technique captured sufficient information to establish large-scale terrane context and
outcrop distribution, and established acceptable sample documentation data.
3 Significant Operator technique captured significant information that enabled critical information capture at the outcrop level as well as
establishing broader contextual framework and established acceptable sample documentation data.
4 Exceptional Operator technique captured information that enabled basic research to be done from the captured images and data without the
augmentation of separate sample research. In addition, operator collected acceptable sample documentation data.
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4.2.4. Schedule
SSOT daily operations commenced after the end of the
day’s traverse operations, when the data from the imaging
systems and voice communications were downloaded and
delivered to the Embassy Suites Conference Facility. Initial
assimilation of data took E4 h. At the end of the assim-
ilation phase, the SSOT Lead determined whether the
following day’s activities needed to be modified. When
modification was called for, the team prepared a revised
traverse plan that would be briefed to the Test Director
prior to the following morning’s uplink briefing to the
rover crew (see Figs. 2 and 3). The objectives of critical
team meetings are described below.
4.2.4.1. SSOT Kick-off Meeting. During the SSOT Daily Kick-
off Meeting, the SSOT Lead provided a brief overview of
(1) the present current mission success criteria status
and planned objectives for the day just completed; (2)
reviewed and prioritized downlinked data sets expected;
(3) presented resource estimates for the following day’s
planned activities (communication schedule, data volumes
[critical and non-critical], and total rover operation time; (4)
presented any mission updates from MMT; (5) outlined the
meeting schedule for shift activities.
4.2.4.2. Science Assessment Team hand-off to Traverse
Planning Team. The Science Assessment Team consisted
of the Rover Imagery Data Team (see Fig. 3), the
GigaPan Data Team and the Rover Science Data Teams.
Their job was to assimilate data from the previous day’s
traverse and prepare a detailed summary of the day’s
operations. Once the Science Assessment Team
Fig. 3. Strategic Science Operations Team process.
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completed the review and collation of the previous day’s
downlinked data, it handed off data products to the
Traverse Planning Team to be considered by
a combined SSOT Team meeting. This meeting
discussed (1) key science data from the day’s activities;
(2) assessment of completion status of each science
objective from the day’s activities; and, (3) identifi-
cation of key events, including either issues that
prevented completion of planned science objectives or
key, unexpected science results that might merit further
study on the following day.
4.2.4.3. Science Activity Plan Approval Meeting. At the
completion of each Traverse Planning Team activity, the
Long-Term Planning Lead presented the proposed traverse
plan for the next day to the SSOT. This meeting was run as a
free and open discussion of the proposed plan for the next
day’s science activities. At the end of the meeting, the SSOT
Lead either approved the plan or indicated areas where
further replanning efforts were needed prior to presentation
to the MMT.
4.2.5. SSOT evaluation of science operations
As with the TSOTs, each SSOT member was responsible
for evaluating the effectiveness of science activities on
RATS 2010 using an identical daily science score sheet.
During continuous communications days, SSOT evalua-
tions added to the data set provided by the TSOT, with the
different perspective of making the evaluations on the
basis of recorded data that was several hours old. The
SSOT was concerned with determining:
 If science objectives were met for each mission phase
 The quality of the downlinked datasets
 If sample documentation data was collected
 If geologic context information was provided by the
crewmembers
4.3. Field Science Operations Team (FSOT)
The Field Science Operations Team was responsible for
operating in the field with the rover crews, assessing the
operation at each field locality that a particular Rover
crew investigated.
4.3.1. Team objectives
The objective of the FSOT was to provide on-site
evaluations of the crews’ observations and sample selec-
tions relative to the actual geology present at any given
site. They monitored compliance with existing sampling
protocols and associated photo documentation, and also
judged the crew’s performance during communication
outages to evaluate the effectiveness of the Tactical Team
in supporting the field activities.
4.3.2. Team methodology
Each FSOT consisted of a 2-person team that evaluated
how each crewmember conducted their EVA science
operations. Each team accompanied a rover during all
traverse science operations. The emphasis was on
understanding, at the ‘‘receiver end’’, how both commu-
nications and operations approaches affected the science
being done in the field. In particular, it was critical for
each science team evaluator to decide the degree to which
the science data collection conducted in the field was
being affected, either in a positive or negative sense, by
the communications or operational scenario in effect. The
FSOT did not interact with the crew in the field, but acted
as the Science Operations Team ’s eyes and ears on the
ground, particularly in situations where communications
were compromised. In addition, the FSOT was tasked with
assuming the management of science operations in the
field if a significant loss of communication between the
crew and the TSOT, caused by an unexpected event such
as weather or major equipment malfunction, prevented
continuation of the nominal mission for periods in excess
of minutes. In this role, the field team kept track of
timelines and the progress of operations, particularly
during traverse stops, to fill in the role that would
normally be undertaken by the SCICOM at a particular
traverse station.
5. Evaluation of Desert RATS 2010 science operations
A critical aspect of the Desert RATS 2010 test was
evaluating the quality of the science return during the
mission as a function of variable communications condi-
tions. This evaluation was considered a high priority by
both the Science Operations Team and the overall mission
management. It was hoped that a clear understanding of
the factors that affect the quality of the science return
would assist in major architectural decisions for future
planetary surface missions.
In order to make this evaluation, the Science Opera-
tions Team attempted to use parameters that were either
measurable or could be used unambiguously to evaluate
the achievement of a particular goal. To that end, a series
of science operations evaluation sheets were prepared
and filled out by science team members on each Science
Operations Team (TSOT, SSOT and FSOT) daily at the
completion of a particular operations shift. These evalua-
tion sheets are shown in Tables 2 through 5. In addition to
the numerical metrics, each evaluation included written
comments on the particular parameter being measured,
whether it related to geologic data or the overall opera-
tions set up. Evaluations involving fatigue, workload and
working conditions were also completed at the beginning,
middle and end of a shift.
5.1. Evaluating science merit—consideration of numerical
metrics design and data collection
As NASA budgets have come under increasing pres-
sure, the effort to understand the effectiveness of different
planetary exploration approaches has led to the collecting
of numerical metrics on a variety of test parameters. This
effort is reasonable and laudable; in particular, unambig-
uous, properly collected numerical test data can help
make decisions, save development time, and settle differ-
ences between devotees of conflicting approaches. A
problem arises, however, when numerical metrics are
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collected on activities that are subjective and non-numer-
ical, such as measuring science productivity or scientific
efficiency. Failure to understand both the mathematical
basis of a particular evaluation and the legitimate math-
ematical operations can be carried out on a particular data
set can lead to misunderstanding of the importance of a
given activity or, worse, lead to incorrect programmatic
decisions made on the basis of poorly understood test
results.
In many cases, it is valid to use numerical values to
evaluate a particular science task. When conducting
statistical analyses of a particular parameter, such as the
radiometric ages of a given rock unit, more measurements
of the sample’s age allows definition of the accuracy of the
resultant measurement. However, metrics collected by
assigning numerical designators to a given characteristic
have an underlying assumption that the assigned value is,
in fact, a number that has an absolute quantitative value
and can be used in the statistical manipulation of study
results. Problems arise if this assumption is incorrect.
Stevens [17], Lord [18] and Gass [19] have discussed the
pitfalls of conducting numerical rankings without having
a clear understanding of the numerical character of the
qualities being ranked.
Stevens [17] distinguished between cases where (1) a
number is a title, such as a designator of a player in a
sport (Nominal Scale); (2) rank ordering of different
objects or events using a parameter that can establish
order but does not define a well-ordered, regular numer-
ical difference, such as the results of a horse race (Ordinal
Scale); (3) scales where there is a uniform interval
between individual members of a set, but where the set
interval is not defined in an absolute sense, such as the
Celsius temperature scale (Interval Scale); and, (4) scales
where the measurement is a ratio between an absolute
zero quantity and a unit scale length, such as the Kelvin
temperature scale (Ratio Scale). The critical consideration
in all these scales is that while each represents numerical
data, statistical manipulation of the data must be based
on the kind of data collected. Statistical manipulation of
nominal or ordinal data beyond finding the mode, med-
ian, percentile and Chi-square, is meaningless. Conse-
quently, it is important to understand the type of
numerical scale used for metric data collected in tests
such as Desert RATS before statistical manipulations of
the resulting data set are carried out and conclusions
reached as to the quality or efficacy of a particular
approach. Ultimately, numerical data can be collected on
many aspects of scientific research in a given discipline,
but the measurement approaches must be fully consistent
with the discipline being studied. Failure to understand
the nature of a given scientific discipline can lead to the
collection of metric data that is flawed, and can, in turn,
miss what is important scientifically and what is not.
5.2. Desert RATS science metrics collection
The Science Operations Team collected metric data on
four separate areas: Science Data Collection (Table 2),
Science Operations (Table 3), Science Merit (Table 4) and
Technology/Operations Implementation (Table 5). The
measurements collected were the result of long discus-
sions within the Desert RATS Team about the specifics of
metrics collection, and at the start of the operation, it was
felt that the designed metrics had a reasonable chance to
successfully discriminate differences between test states.
In particular, it was hoped that these metrics would help
settle a long-standing debate about whether crews on a
planetary body would conduct better science operations
under continuous two-way communications or with
reduced 2/Day communications conditions.
Ultimately, the results of the numerical data collection
were disappointing in that the metric data alone rarely
indicated more than general trends, and did not provide
sufficient detail to allow the Science Operations Team
to understand the underlying factors that contributed to
those trends. Although analysis is on going, the authors feel
that the design of the numerical metrics was inadvertently
flawed for a variety of reasons (the raw metric data is
available from the Corresponding Author on request). The
discussion below of one metric illustrates the problems we
have encountered in post-test analysis of the data.
5.2.1. Science Data Collection Metric data example:
preliminary results and limitations
The Science Data Collection Metric was used to rate
the quality of the geological data collected by each
crewmember when conducting traverses in the form
of either observations of geologic context or samples
(Table 2). This metric required team members from both
the TSOT, the SSOT and the FSOT to score a variety of
activities carried out by crew during the geological
characterization of each field station (see Ho¨rz (2012, this
volume), for the specifics on traverse design). Further, a
total score for Science Data Collection Metric was created
by summing the scores of each of the five individual
activity areas. The TSOT conducted the ratings in real-
time after the crew completed their station tasks, while
the SSOT rated their performance each night after a
review of the down-linked voice, video and electronic
still image data.
The data set for the Science Data Collection Metric is
plotted as a function of geological field station in Figs. 4
through 6. Prior to the start of Desert RATS 2010, it was
expected that interaction between the crew and the TSOT
during continuous communications would eliminate, or
at least greatly reduce, mistakes or omissions, resulting in
generally high scores for this metric. It was further
expected that high TSOT scores would be mirrored by
similar scores from the SSOT. During 2/Day communica-
tions, the TSOT would not be in a position to correct these
kinds of procedural mistakes, and it was hypothesized
that the metric scores would be lower for the SSOT, given
that crew operations would have not any real-time
Science Operations Team oversight.
The data sets presented in Figs. 4 through 6 illustrate the
difficulty the science team encountered in post-mission data
analysis, and two issues became clear during post-test data
compilation. First, individual scores clustered toward the
highest score (see Fig. 4), with only limited values o2. This
lack of granularity between highest and lowest scores made
it impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions about the
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quality of the individual operations conducted. In particular,
it was impossible, on the basis of the raw individual activity
scores, to determine if there were any flaws in the field
operation that could be corrected in future field tests.
The second issue is that the combined metric scores
plotted as a function of field location for both teams
indicates a general trend toward higher scores from the
TSOT (Fig. 5) on days with continuous communications as
compared with the SSOT scores (Fig. 6) on the same days.
Given that operations with continuous communications
should have provided the highest quality science data for
the SSOT to analyze, high SSOT scores would be expected
during continuous communications. This was not observed.
Further, SSOT scores during 2/day communication days
when the TSOT was not operating were generally higher,
and the implying better science quality than SSOT scores
during continuous communications days. In comparison,
metric data collected by the Field Science Operations Teams
during the whole test indicate a generally constant level of
performance of the crew in the field, regardless of commu-
nications state (Fig. 6).
The overall data set implies that the variation in
metric scores between the TSOT and SSOT were influ-
enced by factors other than communications state. In
short, the hypothesis that science data quality would be
controlled solely by communications state was found to
Fig. 4. Strategic Science Operations Team Science Data Collection Metric data for individual sub-categories. The data consists of 65 data points collected
throughout the Desert RATS 2010 test (see Table 2 for definition of evaluation criteria). Note the significant overlapping of data at the highest score.
Fig. 5. Strategic Science Operations Team Science Data Collection Metric data combined score. The data consists of 65 data points collected throughout
the Desert RATS 2010 test (see Table 2 for definition of evaluation criteria). Blue boxes denote periods of continuous communications.
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be not valid, given the consistency of metric scores from
the FSOT. It is likely that some component of the
interaction between the TSOT and the crew introduced
a bias in the data set that affected the SSOT scores, but
the pure numerical metrics do not provide insight into
the root cause of the difference in scores. Written
comments by Science Operations Team members, dis-
cussed below, provides better insight into the factors
affecting science team operations but so far, no single
factor has been identified that directly affects the
quality of science return on Desert RATS 2010. Written
comments by SSOT members indicated that the volume
of data to be analyzed on any given traverse day was
extremely large, cumbersome to assimilate and of a
highly variable nature, making it difficult to adequately
analyze all the data during a given 8-h shift (see Section
6.6). It is not clear how any element of the TSOT process
could have affected this condition and led to the variation in
metric scores. Additional written comments by SSOT mem-
bers also indicate that the practice of placing teammembers
into many different jobs during the course of the 2-week
test may have introduced significant inefficiency into the
data analysis process, but again, it is unclear how this would
affect the metric scores. Consequently, it is possible that
these scores are related less to crew performance or com-
munications state and more to lack of job experience in the
Science Operations Team members on any given day.
Although the data set from the Science Data Collection
Metric provided the most obvious example of this dis-
connect between numerical scores and test conditions,
the team experienced similar problems with other metric
data sets. A critical lesson learned in the process of
collecting science metrics is that numerical data alone
do not allow an understanding of the root causes of
variations in metric scores.
6. Overall lessons learned
6.1. Team composition and qualifications
The professional experience of the Science Operations
Team is critical. In particular, the team cannot be made up
exclusively of either non-scientists or junior scientists with
little experience. As delineated above, the RATS Science
Operations Team was extremely diverse in experience, age
and science background. Having an experience level con-
sistent with the mission goals applies to the rover crews as
well. Desert RATS 2010 was the first such integrated test
where science crewmembers were specifically selected for
their abilities and breadth of experience as field geologists.1
In addition, the astronauts that completed each rover team
had, as a minimum, specific training in sampling protocols,
and the astronaut team included one individual with
advanced degrees in planetary science. Consequently, each




In continuous communications with stable, high fidelity
voice and image data, the quality of the overall science is
better than communications states where communications
are intermittent or have long intervals between contacts.
This is a function of the ability of the science team to
interact with the crewmembers on the outcrop, in real time,
Fig. 6. Tactical Science and Field Science Operations Team Science Data Collection Metric data combined score. The data consists of 146 data points collected
throughout the Desert RATS 2010 test (see Table 2 for definition of evaluation criteria). Blue boxes denote periods of continuous communications. During 2/day
communications periods, the only tactical assets operating were the Field Science Operations Team.
1 In the early years of the Desert RATS series, test subjects were
selected for geologic field experience, but those tests were devoted
solely to 1–2 h duration pressure garment tests and not multi-day,
integrated tests. See Ross et al. [1] for more details.
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and science return was greatly improved by that interaction,
which was not available on 2-a-day communications. The
nature of this interaction was primarily the scientific
discussions that were held between the rover crew in the
field and the TSOT supporting them. The Science Operations
Team member supporting one of the crewmembers on EVA
noted, ‘‘When all systems were working properly, we got
really good data (TSOT A, EVA Science Controller (ES) 2,
Mission Day 1, Technology and Operator Performance
Metric Database)’’. Another science team member noted,
‘‘The EVA process worked very well. Again, an educated
crew following proper protocol provided sufficient data for
science to determine overall regional context and general
site geology. EVA Crewmember 1 (EV1) and EVA Crewmem-
ber 2 (EV2) have become very adept at communicating with
SCICOM and each other without voices running over each
other (TSOT B, Science Communicator (SCICOM), Flight Day
2, Science Operations Metric Database).’’ As it was during
the Apollo Program, the crewmembers on the planet’s
surface are members of a larger science team, and team
interaction in science always improves the quality of the
final product. However, communications will not always be
stable, but a diligent TSOT and a well-trained, scientifically
competent astronaut crew can develop methods to work
around ratty or intermittent communications, particularly
when bad communications are expected. It was noted,
‘‘Limited communications today during first EVA led to
decision to brief crew prior to and following their EVA.
The outcome appears to be very good, and demonstrates
that science objectives can still be met under such con-
strained operationsyrequires well-trained crew and
Science Operations team. Involving science team members
in operational roles allows team members to fully appreci-
ate operational constraints. [This is] better than having
science team as just advisors/observers of the ops. (TSOT
B, ES2, Mission Day 3, Technology and Operator Perfor-
mance Metric Database).’’
With bad communications during the continuous com-
munications phase, science return was limited and led to a
loss of critical science data, such as sample documentation
and geologic context. It was noted that, ‘‘[The] process is
working when comm is working. We are unable to evaluate
the ability of the crew to address all questions without
adequate communication for much of the dayyQuestions
remain about details of outcrop and sample descriptions
due to comm limitations. (TSOT B, Documentarian, Mission
Day 9, Science Operations Metric Database).’’
6.2.2. 2/Day communications
During 2/Day communications state, science analysis
and return was directly related to how well the crew
gathered the image data and provided the verbal context
for that data. Poor imaging system deployment, missed or
poorly aligned backpack photographs, and poor or miss-
ing crew field notes or missed science objectives resulted
in degraded science return. In short, 2/Day communica-
tions state requires crewmembers to do the appropriate
imaging data runs correctly each time, as the SSOT will
not see the final image products until after it is no longer
possible to re-occupy a given station. One comment
noted, ‘‘Unclear context—crew never noted if they were
sampling bf1 and bf2 or just one or the other (Strategic
Team, Long Term Planner, Mission Day 4, Science Merit
Metric Database).’’
However, when the rover crew and the systems all
worked well, the science data collected was as good as
what was achieved during continuous communications.
For example, one SSOT member noted, ‘‘Crew members
did a great job of capturing stills at their sites. EV2’s
final thoughts at this stop with the HiDEF video imagery
were particularly helpful for context (Strategic Team,
Geological Data Evaluator (GeoData), Mission Day 4,
Technology and Operator Performance Metric Database).’’
6.3. Operations team interactions
The TSOTs undertook detailed scientific discussions in
real time to test science hypotheses, and to decide
subsequent courses of action by the crew to improve the
science return from the field. These science discussions
were a critical part of the TSOT process and mission
science, and were independent of communications delay.
They were critical to improving science return, and have
formed an important part of every human and robotic
mission NASA has ever flown. In particular, one TSOT
member noted, ‘‘When we had communications today we
were able to formulate hypotheses in real time along with
the crew and provide guidance to them prior to EVAs to
look for specific evidence or specific samples to test those
hypotheses (TSOT A, ES2, Mission Day 2, Science Opera-
tions Metric Database).’’
The TSOTs, the SSOT and the Mission Operations
Directorate team were able to mesh together as a team
and work well together in spite of limited pre-mission
time for mutual training and familiarization. This speaks
well for the commitment of all members of the team to
accomplish the science tasks in spite of limited training
and opportunities to work together prior to assembling
in Arizona. It was also a critical component of mission
operations, as the Science Operations Team on any mis-
sion is only one facet of the overall mission. In particular,
if the Science Operations Team cannot work effectively
with the Mission Operations Team, then effective science
return becomes much more difficult. It was noted that,
‘‘The ops folks did a pretty good job of keeping us
informed when there were issues which allowed us to
make decisions and re-plan in real time to get the best
scienceyThey were responsive when we informed them
of issues (TSOT A, ES2, Mission Day 1, Science Operations
Metric Database).’’
One area that was not managed well, largely because
its value was not understood prior to the RATS 2010
exercise, was the need for hand-off briefings between all
elements of the mission management structure on both
2/day and continuous communication days. Hand-off
debriefs between the TSOT leads and the SSOT lead at
the beginning of a given shift during continuous commu-
nication days ensures all science personnel have the same
information on critical ‘‘on-the-fly’’ lessons learned and
daily science accomplishments. During 2/Day communi-
cations days, it was equally critical to conduct quality
briefs of the crew in the morning and debriefs of the crew
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in the afternoon. This ensures that the crew understands
science lessons learned from the previous day and the
critical activities in the upcoming day, as well as making
sure that the SSOT understands, at the end of a particular
day, the science results that stood out as well as the
lessons learned and science accomplishments that should
receive particular attention during the subsequent SSOT
session.
6.4. Science team leadership
Good science operations team leadership is crucial for
success. If the leadership is good, it can help smooth out
problems and make decisions that help the team mem-
bers proceed, even in the absence of fully functioning
systems. Both the TSOTs and the SSOT benefited from
good leadership throughout the test. In particular, the
team leads made sure that each teammember understood
the daily mission, and what was expected of them
throughout the day. It was noted that, ‘‘The tasks of the
science ops team were clearly outlined at the beginning of
the session, together with the goals of the session itself.
Timeliness of the work was also stressed and reiterated
throughout (SSOT, ES1, Mission Day 5, Science Operations
Metric Database).’’
6.5. Numerical metrics on science quality
As discussed in Section 5, the science metrics collected
on Desert RATS 2010 did not provide unambiguous
answers to the architectural questions this test hoped to
address. This may largely be a problem in test design,
which was undertaken by science team members versed
in the science operations planning but having no profes-
sional expertise in designing and implementing these
kinds of evaluations. It argues strongly that the numerical
metric data collection process must be based on measure-
ment systems designed by professionals in operations
research, working in conjunction with the scientists who
understand the science operations to be conducted.
A larger issue with the collection of numerical metrics is
that science return is more than the statistics of boots-on-
the-ground time, samples collected or sites occupied.
Science return is the understanding of the geology of a
given planet achieved through interaction between the
scientists on the crew and the scientists on the ground,
and this is not easily measured on the basis of numerical
data alone. Without an understanding of the critical inter-
action between scientists in the process of collecting data
and testing ideas, pure numerical data will be unable to
provide a clear understanding of the reason for a particular
numerical score.
6.6. Training and changes in work assignments
Early on in the plan for Desert RATS 2010, it was
decided that science team members would be shifted
among a number of job assignments every 3 days. The
rationale behind this was both the desire to get as much
training for the individual scientists, and to increase the
number of people making inputs to the metrics database
from a given position. In particular, it was hoped that
switching jobs would eliminate any bias within the metric
database and improve the effectiveness of the data
collection. However, the practice of moving people to
new jobs every 3 days meant that no one was in a position
long enough to know their jobs well. Consequently,
metric data may not represent a ‘‘steady state’’ condition,
but in fact may only be quantifying team members’
inexperience. One team member noted, ‘‘ytraining has
been largely trial by fire, which has its limitations (TSOT
A, Mast Camera Data Evaluator (MastCam), Mission Day 9,
Science Operations Metric Database).’’
6.7. Data analysis activities in support of strategic science
operations
The enormous volume of data coming out of any given
day of this mission was difficult to review, assimilate, and
evaluate the data by the SSOT in the planned 8-h shift.
This was partly a problem of data volume, and partly a
problem of inefficient manipulation and mining of data
sets. In particular, the tools available to the SSOT mem-
bers were insufficient to allow the SSOT to evaluate the
data volumes produced during daily operations, and
metrics collected on SSOT operations were subsequently
flawed. One SSOT member noted, ‘‘I spent over 4 h trying
to translate the video/audio and consequently was not
ready for the assessment meeting. We could really use a
software program that translates the audio into a typed
format for our review; it would allow hours more time for
interpretation of data (SSOT, GeoData, Flight Day 5,
Technology and Operator Performance Metric Database).’’
In particular, the trends in the Science Data Collection
Metric discussed in Section 5 may be related to inefficient
and frustrating data mining and analysis techniques
imposed on the SSOT. Two possible ideas may be consid-
ered: first, when comparing SSOT to TSOT operations, the
real-time assessment, integration and discussion conducted
by the TSOTs during the course of a day may have given the
TSOT a better understanding of the geology than was
possible for the SSOT to achieve during an 8-h shift.
Alternatively, the higher metric scores recorded by the SSOT
during 2/Day communications may represent decreases in
SSOT frustration when analyzing data sets unencumbered
by the additional TSOT data that was added to the databases
during continuous communications conditions.
One additional consideration with regards to science
data analysis during the mission lies in the issue of what
was really needed. The SSOT based its task on an initial
assessment of all the data that was available, which led to
the problems detailed above. Part of the future pre-
mission planning should be to consider, in consult
between the science planners and the Mission Operations
Team, what data will be needed to make the kinds of real-
time operations decisions, and to design the data systems
to make that data easier to extract.
7. Suggestions for improvement
Desert RATS 2010 was a successful test, in that it
integrated science operations concepts from both human
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and robotic planetary surface missions. However, there were
important issues uncovered during the conduct of the test
that should be addressed prior to conducting similar opera-
tions in the future. The suggestions to improve future
operations gleaned from this test can be summarized as
follows:
 If collection of numerical metrics is going to be an
activity in this kind of test, individuals with an opera-
tional research background must be engaged to help
design better metrics than those employed this year.
 Qualitative comments by team members will be as
critical to improving science operations as the quanti-
tative metrics. In particular, the ability to effectively
and consistently capture qualitative evaluations must
be a critical part of the test evaluation protocol.
 Krikalev et al. [14] have raised the issue of ‘‘creeping
determinism’’ in ISS science operations, particularly
with respect to reduction in crew autonomy and it’s
affect on the research being conducted on that plat-
form. Although there was no effort to evaluate this
issue on RATS 2010, an understanding of the benefit of
different levels of autonomy should be undertaken.
Further, it will be critical to differentiate between
creative science interaction between the crew on a
planet’s surface and a ground science team, and more
restrictive ‘‘over the shoulder’’ supervision of in-space
crew by ground controllers.
 If the evaluation of continuous communications on
science operations is a critical test objective, the com-
munications infrastructure should ensure that high-fide-
lity, stable communications exists at all science stations.
 Team members need to stay in a particular job greater
than 3 day at a time.
 Team members need sufficient pre-mission training
and practice exercises to ensure that a team member’s
experience in the tests is a reflection of what is work-
ing well and what is not, rather than being a reflection
of inadequate training. This is also critical for the
crewmembers conducting the field geologic investiga-
tions on the ground.
 Improved technology is needed to make it easier and
faster to assimilate data sets. For instance, it is simple
to speed read transcripts, but impossible to ‘‘speed
listen’’ to a sound file at high playback rates.
 The data set that the SSOT needs to assimilate within a
given shift should be better defined in order to
increase operational efficiency.
 Data mining needs to be facilitated with consistent,
clear file structures and graphical user interfaces
so reviewing a particular data set does not lead to a
lengthy ‘‘treasure hunt’’.
 Better capability for manipulation of datasets, includ-
ing GIS-based interfaces, is needed to extract to critical
data from large mission data sets for SSOT operations.
 The crew needs to be able to review imaging data sets in
real time to correct any imaging deficiencies prior to
leaving a particular locality, and this needs to be part of
the nominal list of tasks completed by the crew during
science operations. This applies to all communications
conditions, but it is clearly a requirement for reduced
communications where a Science Support Team cannot
review the quality of a down linked image and correct
deficiencies in real time. Improving the capability of the
crew to manage the quality of the data they are collecting
will improve mission science return and crew autonomy,
and allow science operations teams to be more engaged
in scientific discovery rather than data collection over-
sight and crew time management.
The planning for Desert RATS 2011 has been underway
during the preparation of this manuscript, and the lessons
learned in 2010 are already being applied to the next test
in the series.
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